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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was there sufficient evidence, as a matter of lawf to 
support an order setting aside a deed transfering property from 
Plaintiff to decedent and imposing a constructive trust upon 
decedent's estate. No evidence or finding of unjust enrichment, 
fraud, wrongdoing or a confidential relationship was introduced 
to support the imposition of this trust? 
2. Was Plaintiff's evidence clear and convincing as a matter 
of law so as to justify the setting aside of the deed giving 
decedent the Barker Road property? 
3. As a matter of law, a marital relationship never existed 
between Plaintiff and decedent. Absent such a relationship, 
Plaintiff has no rights in the property held by the estate of 
decedent. Are the findings of fact, conclusions at law and 
judgment based upon the existence of a common law relationship 
valid and enforceable when such a relationship does not exist as 
a matter of law? 
4. What interest does a co-grantee recieve based on a transfer 
of real property, when the grantor's only interest is a defined 
monetary interest pursuant to a decree of divorce? 
5. Are statements made by decedent admissible to show decedent's 
position on the ownership of his property and whether he 
considered himself to be married to Plaintiff? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of case: 
Andrew Olearain died on February 6, 1985 • At the time of his 
death he was residing with Plaintiff, He had resided with her 
for a period of thirteen months. Mr. Olearain and Plaintiff were 
not married. On the date of his death, he was the title-holder 
of a parcel of real property located at 4145 Barker Road, 
Taylorsville, Utah (hereinafter "Barker Road property"). He also 
owned a residence and property located at 1991 West Leisure 
Circle, Taylorsville, Utah (hereinafter "West Leisure property"). 
Plaintiff filed a civil action against the estate of decedent 
claiming ownership of the Barker Road property, the West Leisure 
property and all personalty of the estate. The basis of 
Plaintiff's complaint was that she was the common law wife of 
Andrew Olearain and that he left title to the Barker Road 
property in trust for her. 
Course of proceedings: 
Decedent died on February 6, 1985 at the age of forty-seven 
years. A petition of adjudication of intestacy and appointment 
of personal representative was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court of and for Salt Lake County, Utah on or about the 
fifteenth day of March, 1985 and Defendant was appointed personal 
representative and letters of administration were issued. 
(Record 2) (hereinafter "R"). 
On or about the ninth day of April, 1985, Plaintiff filed her 
civil action in the same court alleging rights and interests in 
the property held in the estate of decedent. (R. 2-5). These 
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two actions were consolidated. (R. 36, 37). 
On the fifteenth day of October, 1985r Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment came on for hearing. Subsequent to hearing the 
court below found that Plaintiff was not a legal heir of decedent 
and reserved all other issues for trial. (R. 48). 
Trial on the issues was had on the eighth day of April, 1986, 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding. Judgment was entered by 
the court below on the tenth day of June, 1986. (R. 99) . 
This judgment awarded Plaintiff all interest in the Barker 
Road property, (R. 92); various items of personalty (R. 92, 93); 
the exclusive use and possession of the West Leisure property 
subject to her maintaining the mortgage on said property and 
paying a rental amount fixed by the court to the Defendant (R. 
93); and a one-fourth undivided interest in the West Leisure 
property. (R. 93). 
This judgment was based upon the trial court's findings that 
a marital relationship had existed between Plaintiff and decedent 
and that this marital relationship was a common law relationship. 
(R. 84-88) . The court below concluded as a matter of law that a 
marital relationship had been entered into by Plaintiff and 
decedent. (R. 88-90) . 
Relevant facts: 
Decedent and Plaintiff resided together from January, 1984 
until decedent's death. (Transcript 5) (hereinafter "Tr") (R. 3). 
Decedent and Plaintiff were never married. (Tr. 5, 40, 41), 
(Deposition of Plaintiff which was published at trial (R. 167) 
4-5, 53-54) (hereinafter "Depo."). Plaintiff admitted that no 
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license was obtained. There was no official ceremony and no 
solemnization. (Tr. 5, 6, 41). 
Decedent owned the West Leisure property subject to an 
equitable lien prior to the time that Plaintiff resided with him. 
(Tr. 6). The equitable lien was a $10,000 interest reserved in 
decedent's ex-wife pursuant to a decree of divorce. (Tr. 44). 
On the twentieth day of November, 1984, Plaintiff deeded all 
of her right, title and interest in the Barker Road property to 
decedent. (Tr. 9,10, 42). The deed contained no words of trust, 
restriction or limitation concerning decedent's right, title and 
interest in the Barker property. (Tr. 45) (Exhibit 1-P). 
Plaintiff admitted that there was no fraud, duress or undue 
influence on the part of decedent in regard to this transfer of 
property. (Tr. 42) . 
Plaintiff executed the deed to the Barker Road property of 
her own free will. (Tr. 10, 42). Plaintiff admitted that the 
transfer of this property was made to avoid liens that she feared 
would be filed against the property. (Tr. 9 ) . Plaintiff knew 
full well that this property became the sole property of decedent 
and that she was giving up all right, title and interest which 
she held when she deeded the property to decedent. (Tr. 42). 
The deed was properly recorded, with Plaintiff being present at 
the happening of this event. (Depo. 7). 
Also on the twentieth day of November, 1984, decedent's ex-
wife executed a quit-claim deed to decedent and Plaintiff 
transfering her interest in the West Leisure property. (Exhibit 
2-P) . The transfer was done pursuant to a divorce court order. 
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(Tr. 16). Plaintiff was fully aware that this transfer was 
pursuant to a decree of divorce and that decedent's ex-wife held 
solely an equitable lien on this property, (Tr. 42 - 44). 
Plaintiff testified that decedent's net income was $1000 per 
week and that her net income was $200 per week. (Tr. 7). She 
further testified that they combined their incomes in a joint 
account. (Tr. 12). 
The payments for the West Leisure property (Tr.16), the 
Barker Road property (Tr. 52) and purchases for the parties came 
from this joint account. (Tr. 23). In fact, all of the personal 
property which Plaintiff claimed to be hers from the estate of 
decedent was purchased from this joint account. (Tr. 30-37). 
Plaintiff continued with this claim to decedent's personalty 
even though all receipts produced by her at deposition were in 
decedent's name. (Tr. 58). She further admitted that there was 
no proof, other than her word, that she purchased any of the 
joint items. (Tr. 58). 
In addition to the unequal contribution of monies to the 
joint account and Plaintiff living off of that account (Tr. 13), 
Plaintiff admitted to taking a full one-half of decedent's pay 
checks. (Tr. 13). This one-half was used to support Plaintiff's 
hobby of flying. (Tr. 13f 40). 
Finally, the Barker Road property was rented and the monies 
received went into a safe deposit box. (Tr. 12, 39). Plaintiff 
took all of that money out of the safe deposit box upon 
decedent's death. (Tr. 38). 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
In this case, Plaintiff was not married to decedent, but had 
lived with him for a period of time prior to his death. 
Plaintiff has made a claim that a deed transfering the Barker 
Road property to decedent should be set aside, that she be 
awarded various other items of the estate which were purchased in 
decedent's name, that a constructive trust be imposed upon the 
property in decedent's estate in favor of Plaintiff and that she 
be awarded the West Leisure property. 
The evidence presented by Plaintiff's testimony refuted the 
grounds for setting aside the deed and the imposition of the 
constructive trust. She acknowledged that there was no fraud, 
undue influence, unjust enrichment of decedent's estate, or any 
other ground which supports such a trust. 
The evidence presented by Plaintiff which could have been 
construed supportive of her allegations was neither clear nor 
convincing. Her own testimony established that decedent was the 
major financial contributor and supporter and that she, not 
decedent was enriched by the rent received from the Barker Road 
property. Absent such clear and convincing evidence, the trial 
court should not have set aside the Barker Road property deed. 
Plaintiff and decedent were never married, and by law, no 
marital relationship ever existed between them. Plaintiff is not 
a legal heir to decedent's estate and she should take nothing 
therefrom. The trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions 
at law and judgment based upon such a relationship existing 
between decedent and Plaintiff. The findings of fact, conclusions 
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.at law and judgment based upon such a relationship are invalid 
and unenforceable. 
The transfer of the West Leisure property to decedent and 
Plaintiff by decedent's ex-wife was pursuant to a decree of 
divorce. The divorce decree vested in decedent's ex-wife a mere 
equitable lien. It did not vest any percentage of ownership in 
the ex-wife. Plaintiff was fully informed as to these facts. 
She knew what interests were held by decedent and his ex-wife. 
Being fully aware of these matters, Plaintiff took nothing under 
the deed transfering title to the West Leisure property from 
decedent's ex-wfe to decedent and Plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST CANNOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT EVIDENCE AND A 
FINDING OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT, FRAUD, WRONGDOING OR A CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP. 
At the trial, Plaintiff argued that the deed to the Barker 
Road property executed by her to decedent was in trust. (R. 2-4). 
The court so found. 
Appellant asserts that this finding was error and not 
supported by the evidence. No constructive trust can be imposed 
without proof of undue influence, a confidential relationship, 
fraud or other wrongdoing. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632 (Utah, 
1984), Close v. Adams, 657 P. 2d 1351 (Utah, 1983), Carnesecca v. 
Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d 708 (Utah, 1977), and Estate of Hock, 655 
P. 2d 1111 (Utah, 1982). The court below made no such findings 
in the instant case. 
Baker involved a dispute over the ownership of stock which 
was originally held by the parties1 mother. The mother 
subsequently transfered the stocks to herself and Mr. Close, 
appellant, as joint tenants. The mother subsequently died. 
Respondent, Mrs. Adams, claimed a one-half interest in these 
stocks on the theory that appellant held her one-half interest as 
a constructive trustee. Baker, 657 P. 2d at 1352. 
The trial court found the the mothers conveyances were made 
to avoid probate, to provide fair distribution of property 
between the parties, and were free of undue family influence. 
Id. The trial court then imposed a constructive trust and 
ordered appellant to transfer one-half of the stock to 
respondent. Id. 
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On appeal, this Court speaking through Justice Durham found, 
as it should also find in the instant action, that 
the trial court's findings do not show that 
the appellant engaged in any fraud or 
wrongdoing nor [did] they establish any other 
grounds for imposing a constructive trust. 
Baker, 657 P. 2d at 1353. This Court held that "the doctrine of 
constructive trust [was] inapplicable and the trial court's 
imposition of a constructive trust was in error." Id. 
Estate of Hock involved a determination of interests in real 
property. Respondent held a one-half interest in property with 
decedent. This property was sold and the funds used in various 
subsequent real estate transactions. 655 P.2d at 1113, 1114. 
The trial court found that the proceeds of the sale of the 
jointly held property were held in constructive trust by decedent 
for respondent and that the trust continued in each of the 
subsequent transactions. Estate of Hock, 655 P. 2d at 1114. The 
trial court awarded respondent a one-half interest in the 
subsequent property and the personal representative appealed 
claiming that the evidence did not support the finding of either 
a constructive or resulting trust. Id. 
This Court, through Justice Durham, found that the respondent 
and decedent, as in the instant case, "did not engage in any 
fraud, bad faith or breach of a fiduciary responsibility." 
Estate of Hock, 655 P. 2d at 1115. This Court held there, as it 
must in the instant case, that in light of such a finding, "the 
doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable." Id. 
This Court did uphold the lower court's finding of a 
resulting trust based upon the finding that the funds from the 
jointly held property were "used as partial payment for the 
subsequent purchases of the property... ". Estate of Hock, 655 
P. 2d at 1116. No such finding was made, nor could have been 
made in the instant case. 
Carnesecca involved a dispute over the ownership of a family 
farm which was held in different proportions by various family 
members. Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d at 709, 710. This Court found 
that 
[ t] he record is replete with evidence that the 
farm was a family oriented operation from its 
begining. Its considerable success obviously 
resulted from the combined industry of the 
whole family which chose to operate in the 
nature of a partnership. Their relationship 
was one of trust, each relying upon the good 
faith of the other, usually without the 
benefit of written understandings. ... There 
is a $1,200 entry in 1950 which is supportive 
of the oral contract for Joe's purchase of a 
one-third interest in the 18 acres. The 
overall conduct of Jim and Frank [some of the 
parties] in the years following the purchase 
is indicative of their recognition of Joe's 
joint ownership. 
Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d at 710, 711. Based upon this, the Court 
upheld the imposition of the constructive trust. A review of the 
record of this case will not reveal similar findings, or evidence 
supporting the imposition of a constructive trust. 
The record is replete with references to the manner in which 
decedent contributed a larger portion of income to the joint 
accounts and this was the money used to make payments on the 
properties own by decedent. (Tr. 7f 12, 13, 18, 52). Yet 
decedent received none of the funds from the rental of the Barker 
Road property. (Tr. 12). Certainly, decedent's estate would not 
be unjustly enriched by the recognition of the deed transfering 
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the Barker property to decedent. 
No constructive trust should have been imposed by the court 
below, "No constructive trust could be imposed upon the property 
by the Court, as no lack of consideration or undue influence was 
proven in the execution of the deed." Baker , 684 P.2d at 638. 
In Close, the doctrine of constructive trust was held 
inapplicable based upon the lack of evidence of any fraud or 
other wrongdoing by appellant , nor was there evidence to 
establish any other of the required grounds. 657 P.2d at 1353. 
In light of the evidence presented to the trial court below, 
particularly Plaintiff's own testimony, the holding in Close 
must be followed and the judgment imposing a constructive trust 
reversed. Likewise this court, in Estate of Hock, found the 
imposition of a constructive trust to be improper without 
evidence going to the established grounds. 655 P.2d at 1115. 
In the instant case, there was no evidence or findings which 
are supportive of the imposition of a constructive trust. The 
case law noted above supports the required reversal of the trial 
court and the restoration of the Barker Road property to the 
decedent's estate. 
II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WERE NO GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEED ON THE BARKER ROAD PROPERTY. 
The record clearly establishes that Plaintiff failed to prove 
any ground required for the imposition of a constructive trust. 
She admitted there was no fraud, undue influence or wrongdoing 
which caused her to transfer the Barker Road property to 
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decedent. (Tr . 42). She admitted that the transfer was done of 
her own free choice. (Tr. 42). Yet the trial court below imposed 
a constructive trust. This imposition must be reversed. 
Harmston v. Harmston, 680 P.2d 751 (Utah, 1984) addresses 
this issue. In Harmston, the trial court found 
that the subject deed was 'the result of 
plaintiff's free and voluntary acts' and 
concluded that although plaintiff 'may have 
been mistaken as to the nature of his 
stepson's dealings with his property [the 
alleged cause of the transfer of property], 
the defendant did nothing to cause or induce 
any such mistake and did not attempt to 
influence the plaintiff because of any 
mistake.' 
680 P.2d at 752. This Court upheld the transfer to be the free 
and voluntary act of grantor. 680 P.2d at 753. The facts of the 
instant case support an identical holding. 
Baker upholds the argument set forth in Harmston that without 
grounds for the imposition of a constructive trust, such 
imposition is reversable error. This Court went into a detailed 
discussion of appellant's legal theories in Baker . These 
theories included lack of delivery and acceptance, 684 P.2d at 
634; failure of consideration or unfair or inadequate 
consideration for the deed, 684 P.2d at 635; and the existance of 
a confidential relationship, 684 P.2d at 636. Baker, which 
addresses many of the arguments of Plaintiff in the court below 
surely should be controlling and its holding of the nonimposition 
of a contrustive trust applied here and refusal to set aside the 
deed. 
In the instant case, the deed to the Barker Road property was 
duly recorded with Plaintiff being present when it was recorded. 
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(Depo. 7). "A presumption of valid delivery arises where the 
deed has been executed and recorded..." (citations omitted). 
Baker, 684 P.2d at 635. There was evidence in Baker as in the 
instant case, that the transferor knew well that she would retain 
no further claim to it. I_d; (Tr. 42). The trial court in Baker 
found, as the court below should have found, "the conveyance to 
have been absolute and unconditional and not in trust." Baker, 
684 P.2d at 635. Plaintiff, like decedent in Baker, never once 
attempted to obtain the return of the property or told others 
that she still owned that property. _Id; (Tr. 42, 45, 52). 
On the issue of failed consideration, the Plaintiff, like the 
decedent in Baker, lived in another residence rent free and 
received benefit from the rental of the the Barker Road property. 
(Tr. 12, 56-58). Such evidence was supportive of the finding of 
adequate consideration. Baker, 684 P.2d at 636. Futhermore, 
"[a]s between the parties a deed is good, with or without 
consideration." Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 
P.2d 398, 401 (Utah, 1986). Such a finding applies in this 
case . 
Plaintiff testified that the transfer of the Barker property 
to decedent was to avoid various debts. (Tr 9, 42). Plaintiff 
also testified that decedent's monies were used to pay the debts 
on the Barker property and that Plaintiff was being supported by 
decedent. (Tr 52). 
There was no testimony sufficient to establish failure of 
consideration, nor was it alleged. See Baker where a payment 
method similar to our facts were established as constituting 
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adequated consideration, 684 P.2d at 635, 636. 
Confidential relationships are presumed between parent and 
child, attorney and client, trustee and cestui que trust, and 
spiritual advisor and a dying man. Baker, 684 P.2d 636, and 
cases cited therein. In all other relationships this is a 
question of fact. I_d. In the case at bar, there was no finding 
of a confidential relationship. Plaintiff and decedent were not 
even married. (Tr. 5, 40, 41). No confidential relationship 
existed as a matter of law nor was there any such finding by the 
court below. 
Further, "a deed regular in form is presumed to convey the 
entire fee simple title, or at least whatever title grantor has." 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P .2d 156, 158 (Utah, 1976) (citations 
omitted). Plaintiff did not prove any irregularity in the deed, 
nor any words of restriction upon the grant. (Tr 45). The court 
below had the deed before it. 
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake or the like attributable to 
the grantee, a competent grantor will not be permitted to attack 
or impeach his own deed." Barlow, 723 P.2d at 401, (citation 
omitted). None of these requirements were proven at trial. 
Therefor there could have been no evidence supportive of any 
grounds for the setting aside of the deed, and that setting 
asided must be reversed by this Court. 
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III. ANY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF DID NOT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW ARISE TO THE LEVEL OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SO AS TO 
SATISFY THIS EVIDENTIARY STANDARD. ABSENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT SET ASIDE THE DEED TO THE 
BARKER ROAD PROPERTY AND IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. 
The law in this state is clear that to overcome the 
presumption concerning the valid delivery of a deed to real 
property, as discussed above, the contesting party is required to 
satisfy an evidentiary standard stated as clear and convincing. 
Barlow, 398 P.2d at 400, Jacobsen, 557 P.2d at 158. Plaintiff 
asked the lower court to alter a deed which was regular in form. 
This court has clearly stated that 
in most cases involving constructive or 
resulting trusts, we are called upon to alter 
a deed or other writing which is regular in 
form and is presumed to convey a clear and 
unambiguous title. When such a deed or 
document is attacked, the party alleging the 
variance must prove the claim by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d at 1114, (Citations omitted). See also, 
Baker, 684 P.2d at 634, Carnesecca, 572 P.2d at 710, Nielson v. 
Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511, 513 (Utah, 1976) and Harmston, 680 P.2d 
at 752. 
The record and trial transcript are replete with Plaintiff's 
evidence concerning the disposition of the Barker and the West 
Leisure property. All of the evidence supports a conclusion that 
there was no fraud, duress, undue influence or other wrong doing 
by decedent, or that he was unjustly enriched by the transfer of 
the Barker property. Likewise, all evidence regarding the West 
Leisure property was that it was decedent's prior to any 
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relationship with Plaintiff and no interest was transfered to 
Plaintiff by decedent. Therefor the imposition of a constructive 
trust by the trial court was in error. 
This Court examined this issue in Parks v. zions First 
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah, 1983), and upheld the 
imposition of a constructive trust. 673 P.2d at 600. But that 
imposition was supported by evidence that "clearly and adequately 
supports the trial court's finding that plaintiff's labors and 
earnings were responsible for the acquisition of a substantial 
portion of the marital estate." Icl, This court further found 
that it was 
appropriate to conclude that plaintiff had an 
'equitable interest' in the subject property, 
and that the total inclusion of such property 
in the estate of Mrs. Parks constituted an 
'unjust enrichment' of her estate. 
Id. 
The facts of Parks are that plaintiff and decedent were 
husband and wife and that plaintiff was continuously and 
gainfully employed while decedent was only occasionally employed. 
673 P.2d at 591, 592. The evidence further showed that when the 
various properties were acquired plaintiff had substantial income 
and that plaintiff's income and labor were responsible for 
various improvements to and maintenance of the properties. 673 
P.2d at 600. This evidence was clear and convincing. Id. 
The instant case is markedly different in the facts as to 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff and decedent were never married. (Tr 5, 40, 
41). Plaintiff herein was not the main source of income. (Tr 7, 
40). Plaintiff's net income was approximately $800 per month 
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while decedents was approximately $4f000 per month. (Tr 7,40). 
Decedent's conduct approached the conduct of the plaintiff in 
Parks more than Plaintiff's conduct. Decedent's labors and 
moneys were used to maintain the Plaintiff and the properties. 
(Tr 52) . 
Based upon these factual differences, the opposite holding of 
Parks should be derived in the instant case. There was no clear 
and convincing evidence supporting the imposition of a 
constructive trust or setting aside the deed. 
As in Parks, this Court upheld the imposition of constructive 
trust in Estate of Hocks. That was based on petitioner's 
showing that his one-half interest in the joint property was used 
as partial payments in the subsequent purchases of property. 655 
P.2d at 1116. There was no such evidence in the instant case. 
Plaintiff's evidence shows total divestment of interests in the 
Barker Road property. (Tr 42). 
In Baker, the transferor conveyed the property to remove her 
assets from potential creditors. 684 P.2d at 635, The transferor 
never attempted to obtain its return or told anyone that she 
still owned the property. I_d. That trial court's finding that 
the conveyance had been absolute, unconditional and not in trust 
was not disturbed since this was an absence of any clear evidence 
supportive of an attack on the deed. Id. 
The facts of Baker are very similar to the instant case; 
Plaintiff's transfer of the Barker Road property was to avoid 
potential creditors (Tr 9, 42), and the conveyance was absolute, 
unconditional and not in trust. (Tr 42, 45). Therefor, the 
trial court in the instant case should have followed Baker and 
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not imposed a constructive trust or set aside the deed, 
IV. NO MARITAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEEN PLAINTIFF AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. PLAINTIFF IS A LEGAL STRANGER TO THE PROPERTY 
HELD IN THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT AND ANY FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH 
A RELATIONSHIP ARE INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE . 
Plaintiff testified that she and decedent were never married. 
(Tr 5, 6, 40, 41). She further testified that their relationship 
was not solemnized in this state or any other. I<&. No marriage 
license was ever obtained. (Tr 5, 41). 
Utah law at the time when Plaintiff and decedent were living 
together was clear on this issue. Section 30-1-2 Utah Code 
Annot., 1977, Marriages prohibited and void, states clearly that 
"the following marriages are prohibited and declared void: ... 
(3) When not solemnized by an authorized person, except as 
provided in section Section 30-1-5". Section 30-1-5 Utah Code 
Annot., 1953, concerns the validity of marriage solemnized by an 
unauthorized person. Section 30-1-4, Utah Code Annot., 1953, 
likewise clearly states that "[m]arriages solemnized in any other 
country, state or territory, if valid where solemnized, are valid 
here." 
These laws were changed in April, 1987 by the addition of 
section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annot., 1987, Validity of marriage 
not solemnized. This section was enacted after the date of trial 
in the instant matter and is not applicable. 
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This issue was thoroughly discussed by this Court in the case 
_ln £e Vetas1 Estate, 170 P.2d 183, 110 Utah 187 (1946). 
Appellant therein appealed the finding that she was not the 
lawful wife of decedent, that she was denied letters of 
administration and that she was not an heir of decedent. 
The facts are remarkably similar to those herein. The 
appellant and decedent in Vetasf Estate resided together for 
approximately two years. 170 P.2d at 184. They travelled to 
Salmon City, Idaho to become married but upon arrival found that 
such was not possible because it was a Sunday and the courthouse 
was closed, ici. They decided to hold themselves out as married 
and agreed that they were married. Id. 
The trial court concluded that there was no valid marriage 
between appellant and decedent. I_d. This Court reviewed that 
finding stating that the Court had 
heretofore held that a common-law marriage 
cannot be consummated in this state; that 
marriage in this state must be solemnized as 
required by our statutes. 
Id, (citations omitted). 
This Court then examined the statutes concerning marriage. 
Section 40-1-2 Utah Code Annot., 1943, which read "[t]he 
following marriages are prohibited and declared void: ... (3) 
When not solemnized by an authorized person, except as provided 
in Section 40-1-5." Section 40-1-5, Utah Code Annot. 1943, 
concerns the validity of marriage solemnized by an unauthorized 
person. 
This Court considered the purposes of the statute and stated 
that 
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[t]he purpose of enactments requiring the 
solemnization of marriage before an authorized 
person, together with those dealing with the 
prior procurement of a license, is doubtless 
to protect the parties to the marriage 
contract in the rights flowing therefrom, and 
likewise to protect their offspring. 
Vetas1 Estate, 170 P.2d at 186. This Court also considered the 
statutes of the neighboring states of California, Idaho, Montana 
and Colorado. _lc3. The conclusion drawn was that 
[t]aking into consideration the purposes of 
the statute requiring solemnization within the 
state, the meaning of the words employed, the 
departure from neighboring examples in the 
employment of the word 'solemnized1 in Sec. 
40-1-4, supra, the holding is compelled that 
persons domiciled in Utah may not go into 
another state, there contract a 'common law 
marriage', and, returning here, have such 
marriage recognized as valid. 
It follows that the finding of the trial 
court to the effect that appellant was not the 
wife of George Vetas during his lifetime, and 
hence not his surviving widow, must be 
sustained. 
Vetas1 Estate, 170 P.2d at 183 
These 1943 statutes read in material part identically with 
the corresponding statutes in effect at the time of trial in our 
case. Therefor the dicussion of this Court in Vetas' Estate is 
relevant and controlling in the instant matter. 
As in Vetas' Estate, the Plaintiff and decedent did live 
together. (Tr 3). They were never married nor was there any 
solemnization of the relationship as required by statute. (Tr 5, 
6, 40, 41). No license of marriage was obtained. (Tr 5, 41). 
The only "ceremony" was a private matter between Plaintiff and 
decedent. (Tr 5, 6). These facts are in essence restatements of 
the facts in Vetas' Estate and like that case, the court herein 
should have held no marriage. The probate court herein did 
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declare that Plaintiff was not an heir of decedent. (R. 48). 
Based upon these facts, the trial court was in error in 
finding that a marital relationship existed and in awarding 
Plaintiff any interest in the property of decedent's estate. The 
holding in Vetas' Estate must apply herein - Plaintiff is not the 
wife of decedent and not a surviving spouse. 
Therefor under section 75-2-101, et. seq. Utah Code Annot., 
1953 (as amended), Plaintiff takes nothing from decedent's 
estate. The property of decedent awarded to Plaintiff must be 
returned to decedent's estate and the constructive trust lifted 
from the estate. 
To the extent that the trial court's judgment was entered 
based upon the existence of a marital relationship, that judgment 
is incorrect. It is well settled law that "the courts should 
grant the relief to which the proof shows the party is entitled." 
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 564 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah, 1977) (citations 
omitted). In yet another case, this Court has stated 
that the findings must themselves be 
sufficient to provide a sound foundation for 
the judgment, and conversely, that any proper 
judgment can only be entered in accordance 
with the findings. it is then necessary to 
look to the findings to determine whether 
there is such a basis therein to justify the 
judgment. 
Forbush v^_ Forbush, 578 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah, 1978) (citations 
omitted). 
Therefor, this Court must look to the findings of the trial 
court to see if they justify the judgment entered below. The 
trial court found that there was a marital relationship and that 
this marital relationship was a common law relationship. (R. 84-
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89). The trial court then made the award of property to 
Plaintiff based upon these findings* 
As discussed above, there was by law no marriage nor marital 
relationship between Plaintiff and decedent. The statutory 
requirements for such a relationship were never met by Plaintiff 
and decedent. Therefor the judgment, and award of property 
thereon, cannot stand. The property awarded to Plaintiff must be 
returned to the estate of decedent, the constructive trust upon 
the property in the estate lifted and Plaintiff awarded nothing 
from the estate. 
V. THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT GRANTING A ONE-QUARTER OWNERSHIP 
INTEREST TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THE WEST LEISURE PROPERTY WAS ERROR. 
Decedent and his ex-wife were divorce on or about July 13, 
1983. The decree of divorce (trial exhibit 9-D) awarded the West 
Leisure property to decedent and reserved a $10,000 interest in 
his ex-wife. (Tr 44). Decedent paid his ex-wife the $10,000 from 
his own funds during the time he was residing with Plaintiff. 
(Tr. 44). On receipt of the money, the ex-wife executed a quit-
claim deed conveying her interest in this property to Andrew B. 
Olearain and Joan E. Olearain. ( Tr. 42-45, Trial exhibit 2-P). 
A quit-claim deed conveys only the interest held by the 
grantor. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah, 1983). In the 
instant case, the grantor's only interest was that which had been 
awarded to her pursuant to the decree of divore. There is no 
basis on the record to award Plaintiff a one-quarter interest in 
the West Leisure property. 
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This issue was addressed by this Court in Nelson v. Davisy 
592 P.2d 594 (Utah, 1979). Nelson involved the disposition of 
real property in a divorce setting. The wife executed a deed of 
her interest in the home of the parties to her daughter. 592 
P.2d at 596. The daughter had actual knowledge of the existence 
of orders of the trial court concerning the disposition of this 
property. Id. 
Based upon these facts, this Court affirmed the lower court's 
award of the property to the estate of the husband. 592 P.2d 
597. In affirming the lower court, this Court stated that 
"because of that actual knowledge, any interest she [daughter] 
may have acquired by the quit claim deed, was subject to the 
disposition of the property to be made in that action." Id. 
As in Nelson, this Plaintiff had the same knowledge as did 
the daughter. Nelson controls the instant case. The award of 
any interest in the West Leisure property which was granted to 
Plaintiff must be restored to the estate of decedent. 
Even setting Nelson aside, the facts alone support the 
restoration of the property to decedent's estate in its entirety. 
There was no evidence before the court to establish Plaintiff had 
any interest in this property, let alone the one-quarter interest 
it award to her. 
Decedent's ex-wife held only a $10,000 equitable lien in the 
West Leisure property. She held no incidents of ownership in 
that property. She could only give what she had - that equitable 
interest. The only evidence before the court was; the evidence 
at trial, the divorce decree; and the deed. 
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Plaintiff testified that she knew that decedent's ex-wife's 
only interest was the equitable lien. She even knew the amount 
of the lien and the details of how decedent paid it off. 
The decree of divorce was in evidence and supported the fact 
that decedent's ex-wife held only an equitable lien on the 
property. This decree proved that the ex-wife held no ownership 
interest in the property itself. 
The deed proved that the ex-wife transfered her interest in 
the West Leisure property. She only held an equitable lien, 
therefor that is all she could have given up. Plaintiff could 
have taken no more than what the ex-wife had to give, the equity 
interest. 
That means that Plaintiff could only have take a portion of 
the equity interest. Yet the court awarded Plaintiff with a full 
one-quarter interest in this real property. This is an error 
which must be reversed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE PERSONALTY 
WHICH WAS IN DISPUTE. 
The trial court awarded Plaintiff numerous items of 
personalty. (Tr. 92-93). This was done despite Plaintiff's 
testimony that the receipts for these items were all in decedents 
name and that she had no proof to the contrary. (Tr. 58). 
Plaintiff testified that the parties purchases came from 
their joint account. (Tr. 23). In fact, she testified that all 
of the personal property which she was claiming should be awarded 
to her was purchased from this account. (Tr. 30-37). 
As argued supra, Plaintiff was not decedent's wife and was 
adjudged not to be an heir. Those previous arguments apply here. 
Plaintiff was a legal stranger to decedent's estate and it is 
error for her to be awarded any property from the estate. 
The arguments made concerning constructive trusts supra,also 
apply here. Plaintiff did not present any evidence to support 
the imposition of a constructive trust concerning these items. 
The objective evidence presented was that these items were 
purchased by decedent. Plaintiff did not show by clear and 
convincing evidence any of the grounds required for the 
imposition of a constructive trust in regard to these items of 
personalty. The award of such is error. 
VII• THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT TESTIMONY 
THAT DECEDENT DID NOT CONSIDER PLAINTIFF TO BE HIS WIPE, THAT 
DECEDENT OWNED THE BARKER ROAD PROPERTY AND THAT DECEDENT NEVER 
MADE ANY CONVEYENCE OF PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court refused to admit testimony proffered by 
Defendant which would have shown that decedent did not consider 
Plaintiff to be his wife, that he alone owned the Barker Road 
property and that he never may any conveyance of property to the 
Plaintiff. (Tr. 61-65) . 
This evidence was clearly admissible under Rule 601 (c), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Proffer of the evidence was made to the trial 
judge . (Tr. 65). 
Further, there was a conference in chambers on this issue 
prior to trial wherein counsel for the parties agreed that 
statements made by the deceased could be offered in trial. (Tr. 
62)• Counsel for Defendent in reliance on this agreement did not 
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object to Plaintiff's testimony on these matters. Yet 
Plaintiff's counsel objected when Defendent attempted to present 
testimony on these matters and was sustained. 
In light of the agreement alone, it was error for the trial 
court to refuse admission of this evidence. This refusal is 
clear error under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below committed reversable error when it set aside 
the deed on the Barker Road property and imposed a constructive 
trust upon the property held by the estate of decedent. At 
trial, Plaintiff did not produce any evidence of unjust 
enrichment, fraud, wrongdoing or other ground upon which the 
court below could have set aside that deed or imposed a 
constructive trust. 
The evidence presented by Plaintiff refuted the setting aside 
of the deed and the imposition of the constructive trust. 
Plaintiff herself proved that there was no fraud, undue 
influence, unjust enrichment of decedent or any other grounds to 
support her claims to the Barker Road property or any other 
property in decedent's estate. The trial court could not have 
found clear and convincing evidence to justify setting aside the 
Barker property deed and impose a constructive trust on the 
properties held in decedent's estate. Further, testimony 
concerning decedent's statements concerning the ownership of all 
property in issue should have been admitted. 
Plaintiff and decedent were never married, and by law, no 
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marital relationship ever existed between them. Therefor 
Plaintiff is not a legal heir to decedent's estate and she should 
take nothing therefrom. Further, the findings of fact, 
conclusions at law and judgment entered by the court below based 
upon the finding of such a relationship are invalid and 
unenforceable. The evidence proffered concerning decedent's view 
of this relationship should have been admitted. 
The transfer by decedent's ex-wife of her interest in the 
West Leisure property to decedent and Plaintiff was pursuant to a 
decree of divorce. This decree vested in decedent's ex-wife an 
equitable lien in the sum of $10,000. Plaintiff was fully 
informed as to these facts and the interests held by decedent and 
his ex-wife respectively. Being fully aware of these matters, 
Plaintiff took nothing under the deed transfering title to the 
West Leisure property from decedent's ex-wfe to decedent and 
Plaintiff. 
The trial court's judgment must be reversed. The deed 
transfering the Barker property to decedent reinstated and this 
property restored to the estate. The constructive trust must be 
lifted from the property of the estate of decedent. The 
Plaintiff must be declared not to be the spouse of decedent or to 
have ever been in a marital relationship with decedent and to 
have no claim to any of the property in decedent's estate. The 
trial court judgments, findings and conclusions based upon the 
existance of any marital relationship must be rendered invalid 
and unenforceable. 
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DATED this day of July, 1987. 
Jerrald D. Conder 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
30-1-2 Utah Code Annot, (1977) 
In effect as of time of trial herein. 
Marriages prohibited and void. The following marriages are 
prohibited and declared void: 
(1) With a person afflicted with syphilis or gonorrhea that 
is communicable or that may become communicable. 
(2) When there is a husband or wife living from whom the 
person marrying has not been divorced. 
(3) When not solemnized by an authorized person, except as 
provided in Section 30-1-5. 
(4) When a male or female is under sixteen years of age 
unless consent is obtain as provided in Section 30-1-9. 
(5) When the male or female in under 14 years of age. 
(6) When a divorced person and any person other than the one 
from whom the divorce was secured until the divorce decree 
becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is taken, until after the 
affirmance of the decree. 
(7) Between persons of the same sex 
30-1-4 Utah Code Annot., (1953) 
Validity of foreign marriages. Marriages solemnized in any other 
country, state or territory, if valid where solemnized, are valid 
here. 
A-l 
30-1-4.5 Utah Code Annot.f (1987) 
Validity of marriage not solemnized* 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter 
shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two 
consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage 
under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; 
and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform 
and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this 
section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under 
this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
A-2 
30-1-5 Utah Code Annot.f (1953) 
Marriage solemnization - Before unauthorized person - Validity* 
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have 
authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, 
if consummated in the belief of the parties or either of them 
that he had such authority and that they have been lawfully 
married. 
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RULE 601 (C), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Statement of declarant offered in action against his estate. 
(1) Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the 
heresay ruly when offered in an action upon a claim or demand 
against the estate of the declarant if the statement was made 
upon the personal knowledge of the declarant at a time when the 
matter had been recently perceived by him and while his 
recollection was clear. 
(2) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this section 
if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate 
its lack of trustworthiness. 
A-4 
UTAH CODE 
1987-1988 Uniform Probate Code 75-2-103. 
75-1-403. Pleadings - When parties bound by 
others - Notice. 
(1) In formal proceedings involving trusts or 
estates of decedents, minors, protected persons, or 
incapacitated persons, and in judicially supervised 
settlements, the following apply: 
(a) Interests to be affected shall be described in 
pleadings which give reasonable information to 
owners by name or class, by reference to the instr-
ument creating the interests, or in other appropriate 
manner. 
(b) Persons are bound by orders binding others 
in the following cases: 
(i) Orders binding the sole holder or all co-
holders of a power of revocation or a presently-
exercisable general power of appointment, including 
one in the form of a power of amendment, bind 
other persons to the extent their interests (as objects, 
takers in default, or otherwise) are subject to the 
power. 
(ii) To the extent there is no conflict of inte-
rest between them or among persons represented, 
orders binding a conservator bind the person whose 
estate he controls; orders binding a guardian bind 
the ward if no conservator of his estate has been 
appointed; orders binding a trustee bind beneficia-
ries of the trust in proceedings to probate a will 
establishing or adding to a trust, to review the acts 
or accounts of a prior fiduciary and in proceedings 
involving creditors or other third parties; and orders 
binding a personal representative bind persons int-
erested in the undistributed assets of a decedent's 
estate in actions or proceedings by or against the 
estate. If there is no conflict of interest and no 
conservator or guardian has been appointed, a 
parent may represent his minor child. 
(iii) An unborn or unascertained person who 
is not otherwise represented is bound by an order to 
the extent his interest is adequately represented by 
another party having a substantially identical inte-
rest in the proceeding. 
(c) Notice is required as follows: 
(i) Notice as prescribed by section 75-1-401 
shall be given to every interested person or to one 
who can bind an interested person as described in 
subsections (IXbXO or (l)(b)(ii) above. Notice may 
be given both to a person and to another who may 
bind him. 
(ii) Notice is given to unborn or unascerta-
ined persons, who are not represented under subse-
ctions (IXbXO or (l)(b)(ii) above, by giving notice to 
all known persons whose interests in the proceedings 
are substantially identical to those of the unborn or 
unascertained persons. 
(d) At any point in a proceetfing, a court may 
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interest 
of a minor, an incapacitated, unborn, or unascert-
ained person, or a person whose identity or address 
is unknown, if the court determines that represent-
ation of the interest otherwise would be inadequate. 
If not precluded by conflict of interests, a guardian 
ad litem may be appointed to represent several 
persons or interests. The court shall set out its 
reasons for appointing a guardian ad litem as a part 
of the record of the proceeding. w s 
75-1-404. Publication in newspapers. 
Newspapers shall publish all notices of proceed-
ings under the code under the heading "Probate, 
Guardianship, Conservator and Trust Notices. 
Consult clerk of the court or the respective signers 
for further information.* These notices shall be 
published as often during the prescribed period as 
FwE5uh Far Annotations, consult O 
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the paper is regularly issued, unless otherwise pro-
vided by law or directed by the court, and as far as 
possible in one column in the alphabetical order of 
the surnames of decedents, wards, incapacitated 
persons, and creators of trusts. 197$ 
Chapter 2. Intestate Succession and Wills 
Part 1. Intestate Succession 
Part 2. Elective Share of Surviving Spouse. 
Part 3. Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Witts. 
Part 4. Exempt Property and Allowances. 
Part 5. Wills. 
Part 6. Roles of Construction. 
Part 7. Contractors! Arrangements Relating to Death. 
Part 8. General Provisions. 
Part 9. Custody and Deposit of Wills. 
Part 10. Sitnaltaneons Death Provisions. 
Part 11. Personal Choice and Living Will Act. 
Part 1. Intestate Succession 
75-2-101. Intestate estate. 
75-2-102. Share of the spouse. 
75-2-103. Share of heirs other than surviving spouse. 
75-2-104. Requirement that heir survive decedent for 120 
hours. 
75-2-105. No taker. 
75-2-106. Representation. 
75-2-107. Kindred of half Mood. 
75-2-108. Afterborn heirs. 
75-2-109. Meaning of child and related terms. 
75-2-110. Advancements. 
75-2-111. Debts to decedent. 
75-2-112. Alienage. 
75-2-113. Dower and curtesy abolished. 
75-2-114. Person related to decedent through two lines. 
75-2-101. Intestate estate. 
Any part of the estate of a decedent not effecti-
vely disposed of by his will passes to his heirs as 
prescribed in the following sections of this code. 1975 
75-2-102. Share of the spouse. 
(1) The intestate share of the surviving spouse is: 
(a) If there is no surviving issue or parent of the 
decedent, the entire intestate estate; 
(b) If there is no surviving issue but the dece-
dent is survived by a parent or parents, the first 
$100,000, plus one-half of the balance of the int-
estate estate; 
(c) If there are surviving issue all of whom are 
issue of the surviving spouse also, the first $50,000, 
plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate; 
(d) If there are surviving issue one or more of 
whom are not issue of the surviving spouse, one-
half of the intestate estate. 1975 
75-2-103. Share of heirs other than surviving 
spouse. 
(1) The part of the intestate estate not passing to 
the surviving spouse under section 75-2-102, or 
the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving 
spouse, passes as follows: 
(a) To the issue of the decedent by representa-
tion. 
(b) If there is no surviving issue, to his parent 
or parents equally. 
(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to 
the issue of the parents or either of them by repre-
sentation. 
(d) If there is no surviving issue, parent, or 
issue of a parent, but the decedent is survived by 
one or more grandparents or issue of grandparents, 
half of the estate passes to the paternal grandparents 
if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grand-
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parent, or to the issue of the paternal grandparents 
if both are deceased, the issue taking by represent-
ation; and the other half passes to the maternal 
relatives in the same manner; but if there be no 
surviving grandparent or issue of grandparent on 
either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire 
estate passes to the relatives on the other side in the 
same manner as the half. 
(e) If there is no surviving issue, parent or issue 
of a parent, grandparent or issue of a grandparent, 
then the entire estate passes to the next of kin in 
equal degree, excepting that when there are two or 
more collateral kindred in equal degree, but clai-
ming through different ancestors, those who claim 
through the nearest ancestor must be preferred to 
those claiming through an ancestor more remote. 1975 
75-2-104. Requirement that heir survive decedent 
for 120 hours. 
Any person who fails to survive the decedent by 
120 hours is deemed to have predeceased the dece-
dent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt 
property, and intestate succession, and the dece-
dent's heirs are determined accordingly. If the time 
of death of the decedent or of the person who 
would otherwise be an heir, or the times of death of 
both, cannot be determined, and it cannot be esta-
blished that the person who would otherwise be an 
heir has survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is 
deemed that the person failed to survive for the 
required period. This section is not to be applied 
where its application would result in a taking of 
intestate estate by the state under section 75-2-
105. 1975 
75-2-105. No taker. 
If there is no taker under the provisions of this 
part, the intestate estate passes to the state for the 
benefit of the state school fund. 1975 
75-2-106. Representation. 
If under this code all or any pan of the dece-
dent's estate is to pass to the issue of a described 
person, including the decedent, by representation, 
that part is divided into as many equal shares as 
there are living children of the person and deceased 
children of the person who left issue who survive the 
decedent, even if at the time of the decedent's death 
all of the children of the person are deceased, each 
living child of the person, if any, receiving one 
share, and the share of each deceased child being 
divided among the deceased child's issue by repre-
sentation in the same manner. 1977 
75-2-107. Kindred of half blood. 
Relative:: of the half blood inherit the same share 
they would inherit if they were of the whole blood. 
1975 
75-2-108. Afterborn heirs. 
Relatives of the decedent conceived before his 
death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been 
born in the lifetime of the decedent. 1975 
75-2-109. Meaning of child and related terns. 
(1) If, for purposes of intestate succession, a rel-
ationship of parent and child must be established to 
determine succession by, through, or from a person: 
(a) An adopted person is the child of an adop-
ting parent and not of the natural or previously-
adopting parents except that adoption of a child by 
the spouse of a natural or previously-adopting 
parent has no effect on the relationship between the 
child and that natural or previously-adopting 
parent. 
(b) In cases not covered by subsection (l)(a), a 
person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. 
That person is also a child of the father, if: 
(i) The natural parents participated in a 
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the 
child, even though the attempted marriage is void; 
or 
(ii) The paternity is established by an adjud-
ication before the death of the father or is establi-
shed thereafter by clear and convincing proof, 
except that the paternity established under this 
subsection (l)(bXii) is ineffective to qualify the 
father or his kindred to inherit from or through the 
child unless the father has openly treated the child 
as his and has not refused to support the child. 1977 
75-2-110. Advancements. 
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, pro-
perty which he gave in his lifetime to an heir is 
treated as an advancement against the latter's share 
of the estate only if declared in a writing by the 
decedent or acknowledged in writing by the heir to 
be an advancement. For this purpose the property 
advanced is valued as of the time the heir came into 
possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the 
time of death of the decedent, whichever first 
occurs. If the recipient of the property fails to 
survive the decedent, the property is taken into 
account in computing the intestate share to be rec-
eived by the recipient's issue, unless the declaration 
or acknowledgment provides otherwise. If the 
amount of the advancement exceeds the share of the 
heir receiving the same, he is not required, however, 
to refund any part of the advancement. 1975 
75-2-111. Debts to decedent. 
A debt owed to the decedent is not charged 
against the intestate share of any person except the 
debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the decedent, 
the debt is not taken into account in computing the 
intestate share of the debtor's issue. 1975 
75-2-112. Alienage.. 
No 'person is disqualified to take as an heir 
because he or a person through whom he claims is 
or has been an alien. 1975 
75-2-113. Dower and curtesy abolished. 
The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished. 
1975 
75-2-114. Person related to decedent through two 
lines. 
A person who is related to the decedent through 
two lines of relationship is entitled only to a single 
share based on the relationship which would entitle 
him to the larger share. 19*3 
Part 2. Elective Share of Surviving Spouse 
75-2-201. Right to elective share. 
75-2-202. Augmented estate. 
75-2-203. Right of election personal to surviving spouse. 
75-2-204. Waiver of right to elect and of other rights. 
75-2-205. Proceeding for elective share - Time limit. 
75-2-206. Effect of election on benefits by will or statute. 
75-2-207. Charging spouse with gifts received - Liability 
of others for balance of elective share. 
75-2-201. Right to elective share. 
(1) If a married person domiciled in this state 
dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election to 
take an elective share of one-third of the augme-
nted estate multiplied by a fraction, the numerator 
of which is the value of the decedent's marital 
property as defined in subsection 75-2-202(2) and 
the denominator of which is the sum of: (a) the 
value of the estate undiminished by funeral and 
administration expenses, homestead, family allow-
ances, and exemptions or enforceable claims, and 
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DWIGHT L. KING #591 
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 205 Sentinel Building 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 486-8701 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




DAVID LEE OLEARAIN, 
Personal Representative of 
Andrew Olearain, Deceased, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C85-2234 
Judge Jay E. Banks 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be heard 
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court, on the 8th day of April, 1986 at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock A.M. Plaintiff appeared in person and by her 
attorney, Dwight L. King. Defendant appeared by his attorney, 
Jerrald D Conder. The matter having been set for trial and as a 
consolidation of Civil No. C85-2234 and Probate No. P85-206. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary evidence received, 
counsel argued their positions, and the Court being fully informed 
in -he premises does hereby r^ke the f:llr-ving: 
Deceased Andrew Olearain and plaintiff Joan Olearain, 
A-7 
during the lifetime of Andrew Olearain, entered into a marriage 
relationship and resided together in Salt Lake County as husband • 
and wife, creating a common law relationship without having said 
relationship formally and legally completed by a marriage ceremony. 
2. Andrew B. Olearain died on the 6th day of February, 1985 | 
as a result of an airplane accident. 
3. During his lifetime and while he was living with the 
plaintiff in the common law marital relationship, Andrew Olearain 
designated on his life insurance policy the plaintiff as the 
beneficiay of said insurance and placed her on his retirement 
program as his beneficiary, describing her as his wife. 
4. Plaintiff and deceased resided at 1991 West Leisure 
Circle, a home which deceased owner prior to the relationship of 
marriage with plaintiff. 
5. Plaintiff owned at the time of the marriage relationship 
with deceased a home at 4145 Barker Road, particularly described 
as all of Lot 1, Taylorsville Garden No. 1, a subdivision of Salt 
Lake County. Deceased Andrew B. Olearain had no interest in said 
property at the time of the marriage contract. 
6. On the 20th of Novemger, 1984, plaintiff and deceased 
Andrew Olearain were parties to a quit-claim deed under which deed 
plaintiff, as grantor, deeded to Andrew Olearain the interest she 
had in all of Lot 1, Taylorsville Garden No. 1. On the same day, 
the. deceased obtained from Judith E. Olearain, a former wife, a 
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a subdivision of Salt Lake County. 
9 I 7. The deed obtained by deceased from his wife, Judith E. 
Olearain, and the deed made by plaintiff on November 20, 1984 were 
part of a plan by deceased and plaintiff to place their properties 
in their joint names and arrange their affairs as husband and wife. 
8. While living together as husband and wife, plaintiff and 
6
 deceased established their home at 1991 West Leisure Circle and 
7 placed in said home furniture and furnishings that the deceased 
8 owned prior to the marriage relationship, that the plaintiff owned 
9 prior to the marriage relationship, and in addition placed in the 
home furniture that was acquired by the deceased and plaintiff 
while they lived together as husband and wife. 
9. There is a Stipulation on file with the Court designating} 
the items of furniture that fall into the various classifications 
and the Court finds that said Stipulation is an accurate 
disposition of the various kinds of personal property binding upon 
15 J plaintiff and defendant. Under the Stipulation, plaintiff was 






17 Living room: Grandfather clock, planters & plant 
holders, sailboat painting. 
'® [ Kitchen: Table with six chairs, some but not 
all pots and pans, curio cabinet, 
19 I picture on wall. 
2Q I Master Bedroom: Sears radio and plant hanger. 
2 U Guest Room: Bed, bedstead, books, lamp, bedding, 
' 1 green motorcycle helmet. 
22 [j Bars Small table with wood lamp, Curtis 
Mathes TV, some but not all bar 
23|! glasses. 
A-9 ^AJV.. _ .... 
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Pool Room: Books, ironing board. 
Laundry Room: Food storage, and box with 
miscellaneous kitchen items. 
Donna's Room: Singer sewing machine, miscellaneous 
paintings, brass hat radio, three 
door chest. 
Garage: Gold washer & dryer, freezer, 
small blue motorcycle, Christmas 
decorations in boxes. 
Certain items of personal property are not distributed by the 
Stipulation. Among those items are the following: $2,000.00 
snowmobile, TV, recliner, coffee and end tables, coffee maker, 
flight books, and a snowblower. 
10. Plaintiff has resided in the home at 1991 West Leisure 
Circle since the death of Andrew B. Olearain and has paid the 
mortgage payments falling due, the' taxes, and other expenses of 
maintaining the home, and has paid $5,000.00 funeral expenses for 
the deceased Andrew B. Olearain. 
11. The deed dated November 20, 1984 to the property 
particularly described as Lot 34, Best View No. 9, a subdivision 
of Salt Lake County, created in plaintiff an undivided one-fourth 
interest in said property. 
12. Court finds that the reasonable rental value of the 
home at 1991 West Leisure Circle, Lot 34, Best View No. 9, is 
$525.00 per month and that the mortgage payment on said property 
is $325.00 per month. Three-fourths of the interest in the real 
property at 1991 West Leisure Circle is an asset of the estate of 
Andrew Olearain and a reasonable sum for the use of said interest 




13. Plaintiff desires to live in the home at 1991 West 
Leisure Circle and to maintain it as her residence without 
interruption or without being required to sell said home. 
Defendant is entitled to three-fourths of the value of the home, 
^ its interest as determined in this matter, and said interest would 
6 then be divided among the heirs of Andrew Olearain, which does not 
7 include plaintiff. 
I From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
9 
10 
1. The Court should apply equitable principles to the 
relationship existing between plaintiff and the deceased Andrew B. 
Olearain and should take into consideration the relationship of 
13 J marriage that was entered into between plaintiff and deceased 
14 I Andrew B. Olearain. 
2. Personal property acquired by the deceased and plaintiff 
and personal property that was contributed to the joint residence 
of deceased and plaintiff should be divided in accordance with the 







Living Room: Grandfather clock, planters & plant 
holders, sailboat painting. 
Kitchen: Table with six chairs, some but not 
21 ( all pots and pans, curio cabinet, 
picture on wall. 
Master Bedroom: Sears radio and plant hanger. 
Guest Room: Bed, bedstead, books, lamp, bedding, 
1 green motorcycle helmet. 




Small table with wood lamp, Curtis 
Mathes TV, some but not all bar 
glasses. J 
Books, ironing board. 
Food storage, and box with 
miscellaneous kitchen items. J 
Singer sewing machine, miscellaneous! 
paintings, brass hat radio, three 
door chest. J 
Gold washer & dryer, freezer, 
small blue motorcycle, Christmas 
decorations in boxes. 
Court should award to plaintiff the following items of personal 
property: the $2,000.00 snowmobile, the TV, recliner, coffee and 
end tables, coffee maker, flight books, and snowblower. Any 
property not divided but remaining in the home should be awarded 
to the estate of Andrew B. Olearain to be disposed of in accordance 
with the Probate Code of the State of Utah. I 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded all of the interest of J 
defendant in the heme at 4145 Barker Road, Lot 1, Taylcrsville 
Garden No, 1. J 
4. Plaintiff should be awarded a one-fourth interest in 
the real property located at 1991 West Leisure Circle, particularl}* 
described as Lot 34, Best View No. 9, a subdivision of Salt Lake J 
County. I 
5. Court should award to the plaintiff the exclusive use J 
and possession of the home at 1991 West Leisure Circle. Court I 
should order the plaintiff to pay the mortgage payments of $325.00 







sum of $150.00 per month to the Clerk of the Third Judicial 
District Court for the estate of Andrew B. Olearain. The exclusivd 
possession of the home at 1991 West Leisure Circle and the payment^ 
herein ordered should continue until the further order of this 
Court. 
6. Each party should pay their own costs and attorney's 
fees. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this /& day of 1 > U ^ 
/ 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Defendant 
WWf 
ATTEST 
H. DIXCN HlfJLlFY 
O o ^ 
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DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
 By. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 205 Sentinel Building 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 486-8701 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




DAVID LEE OLEARAIN, 
Personal Representative of 
Andrew Olearain, deceased, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-2234 














The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be heard 
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court, on the 8th day of April, 1986 at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock A.M. Plaintiff appeared in person and by her 
attorney, Dwight L. King. Defendant appeared by his attorney, 
Jerrald D. Conder. The matter having been set for trial and as 
a consolidation of Civil NO. C85-2234 and Probate No. P85-206. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary evidence received, 
counsel argued their positions, and the Court, having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby ORDER, 
ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
A-14 
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1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property all of the interest of the estate of Andrew Olearain in 
the following particularly described property: Lot 1, Taylorsvill^ 
Garden No. 1, a subdivision of Salt Lake County, located at 4145 
Barker Road, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 










Grandfather clock, planters & plant 
holders, sailboat painting. 
Table with six chairs, some but not 
all pots and pans, curio cabinet, 
picture on wall. 
Sears radio and plant hanger. 
Bed, bedstead, books, lamp, bedding J 
1 green motorcycle helmet. 
Small table with wood lamp, Curtis 
Hathes TV, some but not all bar 
glasses. 
Books, ironing board. 
Food storage, and box with 
miscellaneous kitchen items. 
Singer sewing machine, miscellaneous 
paintings, brass hat radio, three 
door chest. 
Gold washer & dryer, freezer, 
small blue motorcycle, Christmas 
decorations in boxes. 
pursuant to Stipulation between the parties. In addition, the 
Court hereby grants to the plaintiff the following items of 
personal property: the snowmobile with a $2,000.00 value, the TV, 
the recliner, the coffee and end tables, the coffee maker, the 
A-15 
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| snowblower, and the flight books. 
2 3. Defendant is awarded the following items of personal 
property: the camera and lens, and such other personal items of 
property as remain in the home of the plaintiff other than those 
items awarded to plaintiff by this decree. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the exclusive use and 
° J possession of the home at 1991 West Leisure Circle and is ordered 
7 to pay to the defendant the sum of $150.00 per month, said payment 
8 J to be made to the Clerk of the Third Judidial District Court to 
« I be held as an asset of the estate of Andrew Olearain. It is the 
further order of this Court that the plaintiff pay the mortgage 
payments on the home at 1991 West Leisure Circle in the amount of 
$325.00 per month. The right to exclusive use and possession of 
the home at 1991 West Leisure Circle shall continue until the 
further order of this Court. 
14 I 5. Plaintiff is hereby granted a one-fourth undivided 
15 J interest in the following particularly described real property: 
all of Lot 34, Best View No. 9, a subdivision of Salt Lake County. 
The address of said property is 1991 West Leisure Circle. 
6. Court does not award attorney's fees or costs to either 
party. 










BY THE COURT: 
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4021596 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Judith E. Olearain 
of s a l t Lake City 
QUTT-CLAIM to 
,Countyof Salt Lake 
I 1 
Andrew 3 . Olearain & 
Joan E. Olearain 
of Taylorsvi l le , Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
pursuant to Court Order 
the following «4«cribcd tract of land in s a l t Lake 
State of Utah: 
Lot 34, Best View No. 9, according 
thereof, recorded in the of f ice of 
of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
County, 
to the o f f i c i a l p lat 
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VITKESS the hand of said grantor , this 2^ • - u V *** °* 
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'^' - — 
STATE OF UTAH. 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sail LP.KO County Utah 
JUL 13 1983 
Diane W. Mil kins 
V.ILKINS & WILKINS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
200 South Main Street 
Suite 1020 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Teleohone: 328-4760 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Oj. I?: O hO • I?* i 6 X 5 
JJDITH WRIGHT OLEARAIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW B. OLEARAIN, 
Defendant. 
7 > 11 ~T./«- A-U 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-83-1358 
The above-entitled matter having come on for hearing on the 13th 
day of July, 1983, before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, judge of the above-
entitled court; the plaintiff, Judith Wright Olearain, appearing in person 
and by and through her attorney, Diane W. Wilkins, and the defendant having 
heretofore executed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement wherein 
he consented that his default may be entered and that the plaintiff could 
be heard on the merits of her Complaint at any time and in defendant's 
absence and without further notice to him; the default of the defendant 
having been duly entered herein; the parties having heretofore entered into 
said Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement dated the 28th day of 
April, 1983 as to the distribution of the assets and liabilities of the 
parties, which settlement agreement is on file herein and incorporated herein; 
A-19 Trial Exhibit 9-D 
and the plaintiff having been duly sworn and examined in support of her 
Corr.plaint, the court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and more than ninety (90) days having lapsed 
since the filing of this matter, 
NOW, THEREFORE* IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant be and 
the same is hereby dissolved and that a Decree of Divorce be and the same 
is hereby granted to plaintiff dissolving the marriage of the parties hereto 
en the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree of Divorce shall become 
final upon -« . • t '-" 
2. That no children have been born as a result of this union and 
ncne are expected. 
3. That plaintiff is not entitled to any alimony, spousal support 
or maintenance payments and as such plaintiff is not awarded any alimony, 
S::JSC1 support or maintenance now and forever. 
4. That during the course of the marriage, the plaintiff and 
cefendant have acquired certain items of personal property which have been 
divided between them in a satisfactory manner, with the exception of. those 
ite 's of personal property which are specifically set out hereinafter and 
..nich division is awarded by the court except as specifically hereinafter 
provided, and that hereinafter each shall own, free of any claim of the 
ctner, all items of property of every kind which are now in his or her 
respective possession and control, and each party is free to dispose of all 
items of property which may hereafter be acquired by him or her as fully and 
effectively as if he or she were never married. In connection with the 
foregoing provision, it is ordered that the property shall be divided betwee 
the parties as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall receive the furniture and household 
furnishings in her possession and under her control; the 
Roadrunner motor home; the 1978 Ford Futura vehicle; her 
retirement and insurance benefits through her employment; 




b. Defendant shall receive the furniture and 
household furnishings in his possession and under 
his control; the 1972 Ford Pinto vehicle; the 1977 
Kawasaki 1300 motorcycle; the Beachcraft airplane; 
the two (2) snowmobiles; the two (2) small Odessy 
recreational vehicles; the black powder equipment; 
his retirement and insurance benefits through his 
employment; his premarital personal property; his 
personal effects and belongings; and, 
c. That each of the parties shall execute such 
deeds, conveyances, bills of sale or other documents 
cs may be necpssa^y to transfer the respective party's 
interest in and to the property awarded by the above-
entitled court to the party entitled thereto. 
5. That during the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired a home and real property located at 1991 West Leisure Circle, 
Taylorsville, Utah, which property is awarded to, the defendant.as his sole 
end separate property subject to an equity interest in favor of the 
plaintiff and with respect thereto: 
a. That defendant shall assume and pay and hold 
plaintiff harmless from any liability on an out-
standing mortgage in favor of American Savings and 
Loan Association, Salt Lake City, Utah, in the 
approximate sum of $26,000.00, 
b. That the plaintiff is awarded a $10,000.00 
equity interest in said residence and real property 
and said equity interest shall be paid by the 
defendant to the plaintiff as follows: 
(1) $5,000.00 of which has already been 
paid by the defendant to the plaintiff; 
(2) The remaining $5,000.00 shall be 
paid when said residence and real property 
-3-
A-21 
is sold, is not used as defendant's primary 
residence, or on or before the 1st day of 
July, 1984, whichever event occurs first, and 
c. That plaintiff shall execute a deed or other 
conveyance as may be necessary to transfer title 
thereto to defendant subject to plaintiff's equity 
interest in and to such equity as heretofore set forth. 
6. That during the course of the marriage, the parties have 
incurred certain debts and obligations which shall be divided as follows: 
a. Defendant shall pay and hold plaintiff harmless 
from any liability on the following debts and obligations: 
Ogden Railway Credit Union debt; Finance America debt; 
all other marital debts and obligations; any debts and 
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the 
separation of the parties; 
b. Plaintiff shall pay and hold defendant harmless 
from any liability on the following debts and obligations": 
any debts and obligations she has incurred in her own name., 
since the separation of the parties. 
7. That plaintiff's prior name of Wright shall be restored to 
plaintiff. 
8. That each of the parties shall be responsible and pay for 
their own costs and expenses connected herewith, including attorney's fees. 
DATED this / ^ day of July, 1983. 
> 
BY THE COURT: 
/\
 v ^ ^-vrl_,^£ 
Dean E. Conder 
District Court Judge 
lfl(s€&?-~, 
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